🥊 Ethereum Validators vs Tezos Bakers
🎯 Debate Topic
Question: List the main validator duties (e.g., attest to blocks, propose blocks) and potential rewards/penalties. Discuss in team: How does this differ from Tezos baking?
This round featured three AI models competing to provide the most comprehensive and accurate analysis of the differences between Ethereum's validator system and Tezos's baker system, including duties, rewards, and penalties.
Gemini-2.5-Pro-research
Score: 9.1/10
Justification: Most complete and accurate side-by-side comparison with correct treatment of ETH penalties and Tezos nuances. Demonstrated exceptional depth and accuracy in technical analysis.
👥 Participants & Rankings
Strengths: Exceptional depth and accuracy in technical analysis. Provided comprehensive coverage of both Ethereum and Tezos mechanisms with proper sourcing.
Areas for improvement: Should mark version-sensitive figures to avoid confusion.
Strengths: Well-structured response with good organization and coverage of key topics.
Areas for improvement: Minor slashing phrasing issue that needs adjustment for technical accuracy.
Strengths: Attempted to provide comprehensive coverage.
Areas for improvement: Included non-validator duties and unsupported penalty claims. Remove oracle provision and DeFi liquidations as validator duties.
📊 Evaluation Analysis
✅ Key Agreements
- Validators/Bakers propose blocks and attest/endorse blocks
- Ethereum validators earn consensus-layer rewards; block proposers earn priority fees and may capture MEV
- Tezos uses Liquid PoS with delegation; delegation is native and widely used
- Tezos attestation is two-step (pre-attest then attest)
- Double-signing is slashable on both Ethereum and Tezos
⚡ Key Disagreements
- Extent of downtime penalties: Ethereum has inactivity leak; Tezos does not slash for downtime
- Reward specifics for Tezos vary by protocol version; some numbers cited may be outdated
❌ Notable Errors
- claude-sonnet-4-free: Listed oracle provision and DeFi liquidations as validator duties
- claude-sonnet-4-free: "Slashing for Oracle Misbehavior" is not a protocol slashing condition
- chat-gpt-5-pro: Stated "minimum 1 ETH burned" for slashing; economics are more nuanced
📝 Key Omissions
- Ethereum proposer-builder separation (PBS) and MEV-Boost implications not uniformly explained
- Correlation penalty details (timing and scaling) not consistently covered
- Tezos "payload producer vs proposer" nuance under Tenderbake not always clear
📋 Round Synthesis
Validators propose and attest; Ethereum adds committees/aggregators and optional PBS/MEV-Boost; rewards are CL issuance plus EL fees/MEV for proposers. Slashing targets equivocation, with Ethereum including correlation penalties and inactivity leak. Tezos (LPoS) has native delegation, two-phase (pre-attest/attest), no downtime slashing, and adaptive slashing; fees typically accrue to the payload producer; rewards can be cycle-settled.
Shortcomings Observed
Some misattributed duties, slashing overstatements, and version-specific Tezos amounts without qualifiers.